The Joint Commission on Peace

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The Joint Commission wishes to express it thanks to the Rev. Charles Cesaretti of the Executive Council staff, who served as staff liaison.

REPORT

Introduction

In 1979, the 66th General Convention established a Joint Commission on Peace (JCP). (A *joint* commission has a life span of three years and reports to the next General Convention following its creation. A *standing* commission is a permanent body accountable to the General Convention.) The mandate of that first JCP was to "present a comprehensive program for implementing the 1972 House of Bishops Pastoral Letter as it pertains to peace and war to the 67th General Convention. . . ."

That first JCP produced a report, *To Make Peace,* which was "received," though not formally adopted, by the 1982 General Convention. A basic point of that report was that the quest for peace was too important to be delegated to a special staff person, group, or program; rather the task was to emphasize peacemaking "in all the structures of the Episcopal Church, so as to bring the issue of war and peace directly and actively into the central life of the Church."

To put this point in even simpler terms, the first JCP wanted a commitment to the ministry of peacemaking to grow and develop from the bottom up, not from the top down.

Over 50,000 copies of that report from the first JCP have been distributed throughout the Episcopal Church and the worldwide Anglican Communion. It has been widely used as a study document by those eager to learn more about the biblical, theological, and historical roots of peacemaking.

Acting upon the recommendation of that first JCP, the 67th General Convention created a second Joint Commission on Peace, directing it "in collaboration with other commissions of the Convention and committees of the Executive Council, the dioceses, and the seminaries of the Church, to develop a greater awareness of the centrality of peacemaking to their several missions and responsibilities," to report on progress made to the 68th General Convention, and to make further recommendations for action.

Foreword

The prophetic promise of peace is on our lips virtually every time we gather for worship. From Morning Prayer's invocation of the One who is "the author of peace and lover of concord," through our eucharistic petitions for the "welfare and peace of the world," for "the peace from above," and for the grace to serve God in "unity, constancy, and peace," to the most familiar of closing blessings which begins with "the peace of God," the biblical concept of *shalom* informs and undergirds our life of worship and praise. And those seeking baptism or confirmation do promise to "strive for justice and peace among all people."

Peace is at the heart of our worship because peace is at the core of the Gospel. The redemptive vision involves peace with God, and "peace to his people on earth." Peacemaking, then, must be central to the life of the Christian church.

Our age can appreciate this fact as no other age ever has. The reason could be a growing maturity in our understanding of both the promises and the demands of the Gospel. Or it may be that the obvious folly and predictable dangers of nuclear war have left us no escape from the obligations of our calling.

Whatever the cause, the fact remains: Christians must not hide from the challenge of peacemaking, and fewer and fewer Christians are even trying to.

The widespread study, discussion, and debate on the subject of how to reduce international tensions and avoid the horrors of nuclear disaster is unprecedented. The focus of the debate, however, shifts constantly, and the jargon grows more and more confusing. Such terms as MIRV, MX, Pershing and Cruise, SS-20, Star Wars, First Strike and First Use, Nuclear Freeze and Build Down, Verification, SALT, START, Counterforce, Deterrence, ICBM, and ABM have entered our vocabulary. The subject is immense. Because of the technological acceleration of the arms race and the increasing complexity of the political issues involved, any particular issue that occupies center stage rarely stays there for very long.

There are several constants however, and even more important, there is an emerging consensus on several points.

The first point is that no sane person wants a nuclear war, and even the illusory hope of "winning" such a war is fading rapidly. As one wit has put it, "Winning a nuclear war is like telling another person, 'Your end of the boat is sinking'."

There is a growing awareness that the nuclear arms race may breed more *insecurity* than security. While some believe that this sense of insecurity may act as incentive to lessen tensions, others have come to fear that the very feeling of insecurity may itself become a destabilizing factor in international relations.

Physicians and scientists have warned us that the medical effects of a multiple nuclear exchange would be so *vast* and *long lasting* that they would constitute a *worldwide epidemic* so disastrous that it would be medically unmanageable. The emerging awareness of "nuclear winter" has emphasized that *all life* may in fact hang in the balance, a reality recently confirmed by the Pentagon itself.

Everyone is aware that the resources—human, scientific, and economic—currently invested in the arms race, could, if refocused, help alleviate a number of other pressing needs of the world. And many people have come to see the vast benefits that conversion to peacetime industry and planning could bring.

Complicating the current situation is the presence of a growing sense of frustration. One source of this frustration is the fact that there appears to be no simple exit from the current dilemma. There is no immediate way to dismantle the "doomsday machine" we have constructed to protect ourselves.

Quite to the contrary, an additional frustration comes from the knowledge that, even as the debate continues, so does nuclear proliferation. Destructive power grows daily, and the "nuclear club" is constantly expanding. Discussion of the issues is increasing, but so is the danger to the human race.

Many Christians are frustrated by the knowledge that the ethics which govern interpersonal relationships, i.e., forgiveness, repentance, love of both neighbor and enemy, are unlikely to make a graceful debut in the international arena. There appears to be a great gulf fixed between the world of biblical righteousness and that of *realpolitik.*

It is against this background of growing consensus on some of the major issues, and of frustration at the rate of progress, coupled with intense disagreement about the proper measures to be taken to reduce both the danger and the accompanying international tension that the work of the Joint Commission on Peace (1982-1985) has been undertaken. Our task has been to encourage and promote dialogue and discussion of peace issues at all levels in the Church. What follows is a catalog of some of the things we have seen happening, together with some specific recommendations for the future.

This report is divided into two parts. Part I is concerned with peacemaking activities *within* the Episcopal Church. Our analysis of progress to date has led us to recommend four resolutions to the 68th General Convention which we believe will, if adopted, further the work already begun.

Part II identifies several issues which have emerged during the last triennium. These are issues which warrant continuing attention from, and involvement by, the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion. Several resolutions relevant to these concerns are recommended to the Convention for action. We hope that a Standing Commission on Peace and Justice will be created by this Convention and that it will address these concerns in the years ahead.

PART I: WITHIN THE CHURCH

Attention to Peacemaking in Education

The threat of nuclear war and its threat to civilization; the complexities of providing appropriate military defenses in a sinful world; the impact of rapidly increasing national expenditures to fund the development and deployment of larger and larger armed forces, including weapons of mass destruction; the role of the citizen in helping to make and maintain peace and justice in our world—all combine to demand the active attention of the community of educators (in and outside of the Episcopal Church), from kindergarten through college, university, and seminary. The questions surrounding the issues of modern war and peace are prime candidates for new emphases in research and teaching because they concern the ultimate issue facing humankind—the survival of God's creation.

Where ignorance and confusion affect public debate, objective investigation and bold presentation of the facts by our educational institutions can provide sound knowledge and can lead to properly informed public conclusions, thereby increasing the chances for peaceful resolution of our internal and external conflicts. We all search for peace and justice. We all need facts and informed reason to guide us in that search. If our educational institutions fail to determine the facts, promote objective conclusions, and present them to students, their constituents, and the general public, they may have contributed inadvertently to disaster, by default.

There are responsible calls for action among this nation's academic leaders. In a 1983 address to the annual meeting of the American Council on Education, the Rev.

Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., president of the University of Notre Dame, said: "The greatest moral challenge facing educators is taking action on the nuclear threat to humanity. . . . I have spoken of the pursuit of truth as our greatest moral imperative. There is no truth about the world and humankind today that does not become darkened in the shadow of the thermonuclear mushroom. Indeed, if we are to shape the future, we must educate as best we can, part of which endeavor will be to concern ourselves and our students that if we act as we should, there will be a future, despite the current runaway nuclear threat." The Joint Commission on Peace urges that Episcopalians act upon this imperative at all levels of our secular and religious educational systems and among their alumni.

Our seminaries have a special responsibility to their students and to the membership of our congregations to bring to the center of their academic programs the teaching of how the ordained ministry can initiate and support honest and prayerful consideration and study of the issues of peace, war, and justice among the people to whom they offer their ministry. These future leaders will be required to minister simultaneously to members of the armed forces, employees of militarily oriented industry, those opposed to nuclear confrontation, and those who are active pacifists. Efforts to prepare our seminarians for effective ministry in this area of conflict must be strengthened; they must recognize our Lord Jesus Christ as the Prince of Peace while also offering His love to those who understand the meaning of that in different ways. In this sense, they are to be identifiers of underlying conflict (between the teachings of our Lord and the realities of nuclear confrontation) and to be effective in conflict resolution.

Each seminary faculty, dean and board of trustees can best determine how they are to meet the challenge for teaching the centrality of the issue of war, peace and justice in our Church. We emphasize, however, that we are *not* speaking simply of a course on peace and war taught by a professor of ethics, as important as this is. Rather, we encourage all disciplines, including theology, bible, liturgy, history, and pastoral care, to recognize that the issues of peacemaking in a nuclear age are related to each specialty. We applaud current efforts by the seminaries to act on this perception and urge them to find new ways to do an even better job in the years to come. Our ordained ministry must feel confident about its ability to stir our congregations to an active commitment to peace and justice.

Attention to Peacemaking in the Episcopal Church

According to the Commission's survey made late in 1984, the Church in the past triennium has been making heartening progress in the support of peacemaking. Notably, 60% of the dioceses have by now an appointed peace commission or equivalent task force, while a further 15% have an appointed peace officer. Even among the remaining 25%, several dioceses have been able to give attention to issues of peace and war at a diocesan convention.

Hard-pressed schedules make it difficult for most other parts of the Church to adopt programs calculated to illumine the implicit centrality of peacemaking in their own segment of the Church's mission. Yet opportunities have appeared and have been seized. For senior seminary students in early 1984, three questions in the General Ordination Examination memorably posed issues related to international tensions. The Mission and Ministry Staff at the Church Center has found it possible to spotlight world issues similarly in evangelism materials, and the workshops at the 1983 National Conference on Renewal, Ministry and Evangelism included one on current tensions over arms control. The Stand-

ing Commission on World Mission has provided staff support for the Central America Task Force appointed by the Presiding Bishop (see Part II: Central America).

More definite encouragement to dioceses and parishes across our land has come out of the specific Peace Ministries budget at the Church Center. In Easter season of 1983, a National Conference on Peacemaking drew together at Denver some 200 potential leaders from dioceses across the country to struggle over the various values embodied in opposing or tolerating the arms race. In the course of that year a computerized mailing list was set up of individuals ready to work for peace, who since then have been sent notice of national legislative developments and suggestions of questions worth putting to electoral candidates. At Princeton last January, an invitational conference organized at the request of the Executive Council of the Episcopal Church considered the issues involved in Christian non-violent resistance.

At the same time, synods of three of the eight domestic provinces have devoted substantial programs to peace issues. Yet the activity at the diocesan level and below, to judge from chairpersons' testimony, has plainly been guided more by local circumstances and judgments than by any central leadership. One reason may be that leadership locally has been pulled in two directions difficult to reconcile. One of these is toward opening up dialogue between Church members sincerely holding opposing views on ending the arms race. The other is toward encouraging peacemaking activities by persons already disposed to particular forms of citizen action. The former pull has tended to be stronger where the diocese has set up a representative body and called it a commission, the latter stronger where it has established a task force relying on volunteers or staff.

Some 31 dioceses seem to fall in the first category. A good example is the Peace Commission of the Diocese of Virginia in its first phase. In 1983 the Virginia Commission issued its first report which, in addition to a theological statement and an annotated bibliography, set forth a clearly stated series of four areas of agreement and eleven areas of disagreement among the commission members. This was followed in 1984 by a discussion guide designed for use in parish study sessions, and a commission member was then assigned to each region of the diocese to instigate and encourage dialogue in each parish. A majority of parishes have responded.

At the other extreme, among the 26 diocesan "task forces" and the like, the Diocese of Southern Ohio has been operating a smooth-running Peace Initiatives Network, in parallel with a similar Hunger Network. Over 500 volunteers have signed up for peace work, and the Network provides these with yearly regional meetings for mutual support, with two briefings a year for help from professional experts, and simultaneously with notice of opportunities for local action as occasions arise.

The 1984 survey, then, yields a picture of vigor and of diversity of goals. Because the survey indicates little in the way of cooperation between neighboring dioceses, it is less clear that those efforts are being adequately shared, other than at the occasional provincial synod or the more ad hoc national conference on the Denver model. To be sure, the first requisite is effective grass roots endeavor. Nevertheless, the relative absence of communication between local groups may help to account for the situations in eight dioceses which reported that their peacemaking activities had faltered. No weighty reliance should be placed on details of such a compilation of "thumbnail sketches" offered by chairpersons. But the impression is clear of the difficulty of the task that all diocesan groups face and the seriousness with which they are going about it. What seems to be needed in the next triennium is *not a more centralized direction, but a central office enabled to keep in touch with such groups, listen receptively to the creative elements in their initiatives, and make sure that the lessons learned from the experiences of each become available for use by others.*

The underlying challenge seems to be to pursue simultaneously both advocacy and communication with Church members of varying perspectives so that learning takes place in both areas. As St. Paul insisted, the church can and must be a place that benefits from a pluralism of functions and a diversity of gifts (*I Corinthians 12*).

International Person-to-Person Peace Missions

Interchange of home visits with citizens of countries with differing political ideologies and a wide range of other interchanges with foreigners were given prime emphasis among lines of action for peacemakers in the House of Bishops' 1962 statement on "War and Peace," the statement which served the 1979 General Convention as the mandate for a Joint Commission on Peace. The early sixties were the first years of the Peace Corps and a natural time for optimism over the possibilities of planting seeds of peace through personal encounters. The following years of Vietnam agony and frustration made all this seem unreal. But now the experiences of the past triennium give grounds for fresh and more sober effort.

Central America has been the focus of a remarkable outburst of individual peace missions. Though we shall for a long time be quite uncertain whether they have had any practical effect at all in blocking the forces of war, the Witness for Peace groups and countless other ventures have produced many pockets of direct understanding in our country of actual human situations in the Central American crisis, to counteract a historical North American emphasis on economic and military intervention.

Central America, then, by the seriousness of the contacts and the volume and ecumenicity of the Christian involvement, has been the seedbed for a model of response by our Church to an opportunity for peacemaking by individuals. Circumstances could hardly have been more propitious.

The Soviet Union is stonier ground, and makes a sharply contrasting case. The Diocese of Rhode Island in 1981 led in arranging a Soviet-American conversation between diplomats in the Cathedral at Providence. But nothing since then has come of several plans of that sort, in either that diocese or others. The one major event has been a visit to the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1984 of a 266-member delegation, including seventeen Episcopalians, under the auspices of the National Council of Churches. The courtesies shown by the Soviet hosts to this unusual body of churchpersons created opportunities for scattered moments of satisfying communication. Reports to home parishes, notably in Ohio and the District of Columbia, have surely proved valuable. But the amount of eye-opening contact on the two sides has still been miniscule in relation to the distrust separating the two countries.

What has been most instructive and encouraging for American Episcopalians has been the example of Bishop Tutu, who in his person uniquely symbolizes the interrelationship of peace and justice. Individual peacemaking efforts are a Gospel imperative, even where alienation is deeply rooted and the outlook is grim. Tact, candor, and Christian joy can be combined, as he has shown us, and can help sustain miracles of adherence to non-violence in the face of brutalities.

It is with fellow Christians, whether in South Africa or the U.S.S.R. or Central America, that we have our special opportunity to work as individuals for peace. Clearly, also, we cannot be peacemakers without insisting by our actions that in any clash of ideologies both sides should try for a better understanding of each other's views and a deeper awareness of what constitutes justice. The communication we seek is about mutual social obligations.

The Work for Peace and Justice Through the Anglican Communion

In 1983, a grant of $10,000 was made by the Episcopal Church's Peace Program to the Anglican Consultative Council as foundation funds to establish a peace network for the Anglican Communion. The grant was a response, in part, to the 1983 meeting of the Primates, requesting a survey of peace initiatives and programs across the Communion. The Anglican Consultative Council (ACC) is the London-based coordinating office of the twenty-seven Churches which make up the Anglican Communion.

Using the grant from the Episcopal Church USA, the Rev. Canon Samuel Van Culin, Secretary General of the ACC, convened a consultation of representatives from the Churches. The agenda was to review the work of the several Churches and to identify appropriate actions by the Communion in support of local and regional initiatives, ecumenical efforts, and Communion-wide opportunities in peacemaking. This task group reported to the 1984 meeting of the Anglican Consultative Council in Badagry, Nigeria. The group suggested the establishment of a peace network within the Communion for communication, coordination, and consultation, the establishment of an Anglican presence at the United Nations, and support for initiatives by the Archbishop of Canterbury in such areas as Namibia. Having received the report of the task group, the ACC encouraged the formation of a network under the auspices of the Council Secretariat.

The ACC also applied for observer status at the United Nations, commissioned a series of articles on peace related issues, and planned an organizing meeting of the network. With another $10,000 grant from the Episcopal Church, the meeting was held in London in the Fall of 1984. The gathering brought together representatives from six of the Churches, who formed the ACC Peace and Justice Advisory Group, elected the Rev. Charles A. Cesaretti, Public Issues Officer of the Episcopal Church, as Convenor, and petitioned the Secretary General of the ACC for recognition and affirmation. The Peace and Justice Advisory Group reviewed the progress of work in the Anglican Communion, was encouraged by the appointment of contacts in seventeen of the Churches in the Communion and undertook to begin substantive, supportive work by developing a list of peace and justice priorities by issues and region. The Peace and Justice Advisory Group met in May 1985 to begin work on their priorities and to respond to the Archbishop of Canterbury's request for consultative assistance in preparation for the 1988 Lambeth Conference.

PART I: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Based on our report of work done to date, the Joint Commission on Peace recommends four resolutions to the 68th General Convention for action. The text of these resolutions appears at the end of this report; their rationale is below.

Resolution #A—
Creation of a Standing Commission on Peace and Justice

We believe that the General Convention would benefit from a permanent Commission on Peace and Justice issues. (The two Joint Commissions on Peace which have served during the past six years have been temporary bodies.) Peace and justice issues are inextricably linked. Such a permanent Commission would offer guidance and counsel to future General Conventions. By creating such a Commission, General Convention would be doing for itself what it has encouraged the wider Church community to do: to keep peacemaking a central and continuing focus of the life and witness of the Episcopal Church.

Resolution #A—
Creation of the Office of Peace and Justice

The first Joint Commission on Peace recommended nurturing an approach from the bottom up in bringing peacemaking into the life of the Episcopal Church. The second Joint Commission on Peace has monitored these efforts. It is now clear that staff support is required to help diocesan programs learn from one another, to provide resources to peacemakers throughout the Church, to enable international and ecumenical cooperation, to support those engaged in activities that foster peace and justice, and to collaborate with other program units in addressing peace and justice issues. By creating such an office, General Convention would then be doing for Executive Council what it has asked the wider Church community to do.

Resolution #A—
Support of the Anglican Peace and Justice Network

The work for peace and justice extends beyond our parochial boundaries. In the light of developments mentioned above, it is important for the Episcopal Church to continue to support the work of the Anglican Communion under the auspices of the Anglican Consultative Council. We recommend that $83,000 per year for the triennium be allocated by the General Convention to the Archbishop of Canterbury for this endeavor.

Resolution #A—
Adoption of *To Make Peace*

The report of the first Joint Commission on Peace, entitled *To Make Peace,* has been distributed throughout the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion. The 1982 General Convention "received" it and commended it for study. We now recommend that the 68th General Convention adopt it as an official statement of the Episcopal Church.

PART II: ISSUES OF SPECIAL CONCERN

Three difficult current issues have commanded the attention of this Joint Commission on Peace during the past triennium: deterrence, which has occupied the major part of our attention; the current crisis in Central America; and non-violent resistance. Additional work in these three areas is clearly called for in the next triennium, and appropriate action by this General Convention to further this work is recommended.

Deterrence

At its second meeting in October, 1983, the Joint Commission on Peace received a resolution from the House of Bishops asking it to make a thorough study of the psychology and morality of deterrence and the particular application of the concept to the nuclear arms race. This study was to be reported to the Jackson meeting of the House in 1984. The Commission, after considerable discussion, agreed to respond with a working paper which appears here as Appendix A.

A review of this document will serve to establish the Commission's strategy. It was not our intent to present a single point of view on deterrence for possible formal adoption, but rather to offer a range of options within which the discussion in the House of Bishops

could take place, from the seeking of "military advantage" at one end of the spectrum to non-violent civilian resistance at the other. "Our procedure," we wrote, "reflects the belief that we can serve more effectively as a committee of inquiry defining the issues in an open-ended way than as a jury bringing in a verdict on one of the most troubling ethical and religious issues of our time." The Commission then attempted, in as objective a spirit as possible, to muster arguments for and against each of the various strategic deterrence options, as well as for and against specific actions (such as the nuclear freeze, or a conventional build-up) that could be undertaken within that framework.

After a fruitful meeting in May with three bishops appointed by the Presiding Bishop at the Commission's request for counsel and advice, the working paper was put into final form and distributed to the House of Bishops prior to the Jackson meeting, where it was presented formally by the Commission Chair and then discussed in small groups.

At the center of the Commission's discussion of the deterrence issue was the following passage from *To Make Peace,* the report of the antecedent Commission to the 1982 General Convention: "A strategy of nuclear deterrence is at best a necessary evil for the short term. . . . Christians who accept nuclear deterrence as morally defensible can do so legitimately only if at the same time they understand its primary purpose to be the buying of a little more time to work for other, more peaceful, less apocalyptic alternatives." It would be fair to say that the question which hung over the Commission most prominently, both in the two meetings in which the working paper was drafted and in the post-Jackson meeting (October 1984) when it debated whether or not to recommend a specific deterrence strategy to the Church, is whether the "short term" is now over, or drawing to a close. Has the restraint of the nuclear powers rendered nuclear deterrence tolerable, or has the existence of nuclear weapons made these powers more prudent? Are nuclear weapons necessary if new technological precision makes it possible to destroy military targets with non-nuclear warheads? That is, does the whole concept of deterrence any longer require nuclear arsenals?

To all members of the Commission the large scale use of nuclear weapons, or the use of any nuclear weapons in a counter-city strategy, would violate traditional just war criteria, inasmuch as, at least in a counter-city strategy, widespread death and suffering would be inevitably visited on a large number of innocent civilians, not to mention the potentially incalculable effects on the environment for years to come. In addition, a clear majority of the Commission members oppose any use of any nuclear weapons or any threat to use them. This is based on their assumption that there is no moral difference in the ways nuclear weapons of varying capabilities might be used, and that it is inherently wrong morally to threaten the use of weapons which it would be morally wrong to use in fact. Furthermore, reliance on nuclear deterrence has, by any objective measurement, been coupled with an increase, not a decrease, in nuclear stockpiles since the predecessor Commission made its report in 1982. This fact alone would seem to call into question the future durability of nuclear deterrence as a strategy for keeping the peace, at least to the extent that numbers of weapons is a primary criterion of judgment.

Accordingly, the Joint Commission spent much time at its October 1984 meeting wrestling with the following statement approved in substance by the World Council of Churches at its meeting in the summer of 1983 in Vancouver, a statement which moves beyond our 1982 report in categorically rejecting nuclear deterrence and which was among the materials submitted to our Bishops for discussion at Jackson:

> "Nuclear deterrence, as the strategic doctrine which has justified nuclear weapons in the name of security and war prevention, must now be categorically rejected as contrary to our faith in Jesus Christ who is our life and peace. Nuclear deterrence

is morally unacceptable because it relies on the credibility of the *intention to use* nuclear weapons: we believe that any intention to use weapons of mass destruction is an utterly inhuman violation of the mind and spirit of Christ which should be in us. We know that many Christians and others sincerely believe that deterrence provides an interim assurance of peace and stability on the way to disarmament. We must work together with those advocates of interim deterrence who are earnestly committed to arms reduction. But the increasing probabilities of nuclear war and the spectre of an arms race totally out of control have exposed the cruel illusions of faith in deterrence."

This Commission is unable to reach concurrence on the position taken in the Vancouver statement. While most of its members endorse this position, some are unwilling to go so far. Some strongly object to its inclusion in the main body of our report not only because it appears to give undue prominence to a single, radical statement among many others that might have been chosen, but also because they disagree with some of the substance of the statement and the quality of its argumentation. Nonetheless, whatever their views on its substance, most members of the Commission feel that the Vancouver statement is perhaps the sharpest delineation of the Christian case that might be made against nuclear deterrence, and thus a convenient instrument for bringing our dilemmas into focus. Commission members are profoundly uncomfortable with the misuse of legitimate moral argument in defense of nuclear deterrence to justify indefinite delay in pursuing serious arms control, or as a cover for actual build-up of nuclear arsenals on both sides. While we do not feel ready, therefore, corporately and unhesitatingly to counsel an outright abandonment of our own 1982 statement on nuclear deterrence, we believe that it must be subject to a very stringent continuing scrutiny by any successor bodies in the Church concerned with issues of peace and justice, and tested in the light of how seriously the major powers show themselves willing actively to reduce their extravagantly disproportionate reliance on nuclear arms.

The fact that we are the Joint Commission on Peace does not mean that we are a pacifist Commission. While we recognize and affirm the right of individual Episcopalians to refuse to bear arms on grounds of conscience, and to be supported by their Church in that position, and while we believe that the ethic of non-violence needs to be brought more firmly and more centrally to bear on our daily lives as Christians, we are also in agreement that total disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, is neither a reasonable expectation in the short run, nor, if entered upon without some guarantees of reciprocity by other powers, an entirely unambiguous moral choice.

The Commission as a whole is drawn, therefore, essentially to the middle range of options outlined in the working paper on deterrence submitted to the House of Bishops: namely, that "the United States should work for nuclear arms reduction to the lowest possible level of retaliatory capacity sufficient to respond if attacked" (Option C), and that the ultimate goal of such efforts should be to attain a reliance on non-nuclear defensive arms only, even if this should mean a strengthening of conventional forces, at least *ad interim* (Option D). We are not so naive as to believe that any options are devoid of moral dilemmas. Nor are we so naive as to believe that the entire dreadful cycle of violence between and within nations can be broken once and for all, absent virtually unprecedented and far-reaching alterations in the world's political and economic fabric which would penetrate to the root causes of violence, at least to the extent that those causes are structural. But we do believe that even a rational military strategy, not to mention the hope which we all share for a genuine and lasting peace, requires that the

spectre of the possible extinction of humankind be banished from the deliberations of diplomatic and military policy-makers.

As several recent commentators have pointed out, there is a sense in which strategic nuclear weapons are not really military instruments at all, if the function of war is to procure an advantage over an adversary through feasible, containable methods without putting one's own national future entirely at risk. Strategic nuclear weapons are, rather, instruments of terror brought to bear on diplomatic processes; and given the difficulty if not the impossibility of controlling their application in war, it seems likely that their actual use would be arguably akin to the suicide which the committed terrorist embraces as he drives a truckload of explosives into the walls of an embassy. The distinction between a war which, however imperfectly, may confine itself principally to the combatants and to a limited terrain on the one hand, and indiscriminate terrorism willing to contemplate the destruction of all rather than the triumph of the opposition on the other, needs to be kept firmly in mind in discussions of military strategy.

As a Church, our task is first, to criticize from a Christian perspective the Left-Right polarization of views on the nuclear arms race in our country, in which each side resorts to divisive questioning of the other's motives and patriotism, and second, to replace this rhetoric of polarization with the proclamation of hope. Hope does not require the abandonment of reasonable prudence and even skepticism as to the possible motives and intentions of a potential adversary. Hope does, however, envision a global community whose collective good requires a respect for diversity, and a willingness to eschew the self-righteous vanity of offended national virtue in favor of a more just world order which is itself the best safeguard of our national interest. Given the imperative of relieving humankind from the terror of a possible nuclear holocaust, it is essential to our future as a human family to seek constructive alternatives to nuclear deterrence.

Central America

In January 1984, the Presiding Bishop appointed a Central America Task Force and charged it with the responsibility of gathering information on the crisis in Central America—particularly as it affects the Episcopal Church in that area (Province IX)—and evaluating and coordinating various possible responses of the national Episcopal Church. The 1984 Task Force Report and supporting film have had wide distribution. The following five paragraphs are based in large measure on this Task Force Report.

The Christian Church is at the heart of the social, political, and economic developments in the Central American countries. The Episcopal Church in these countries stands with the people in their struggle for peace with justice. And often our sister churches have borne the martyr's blood.

El Salvador has been in a violent and bloody civil war for the last five years. As a result of this conflict, there are one million displaced persons within the country and 500,000 refugees—mostly in the U.S.A. The United States has given massive support—more than $1 billion—to the El Salvadoran government against the guerrillas during the last five years.

Over the last several years, the Indians of Guatemala—half of the population are pure-blooded descendants of the ancient Mayas—have been victims of systematic violence. The army rules the country in a political climate that has remained essentially unchanged since the U.S.-backed overthrow of a constitutionally-elected government in 1954.

Nicaragua, after a history which included more than 20 years of occupation by U.S. Marines and 45 years of the U.S.-backed Somoza dynasty, is in the midst of major change following the Sandinista revolution of 1979. Since 1981 the U.S. has been backing the

contras who are at war with the Nicaragua government. The contras are funded by the U.S., and the Reagan administration seeks the downfall of the Sandinistas. The two-year war has cost Nicaragua $200 million in damages, 25% of their budget to sustain the war against the contras, and 8,000 deaths.

Honduras is the most underdeveloped country of the region, and, next to Haiti, it is the poorest country in the western hemisphere. The Hondurans are struggling to preserve their fragile democratic institutions in the face of starvation and injustice. Fear is the salient characteristic of Honduras today.

There have been two official visits to Central America by Church Center staff, Task Force members, and Province IX representatives. In March 1984, visits were made to: Honduras, Nicaragua, Belize, and Costa Rica. In February 1985, visits were made to Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama. In addition, over the past two years, the Presiding Bishop, many other Episcopal bishops, numerous priests and laypersons have had person-to-person visits in Central America. They have experienced firsthand the suffering of war, poverty, and injustice; and they have seen themselves how complex are the political and social realities of Central America.

In the light of what we have learned, both from the Task Force Report and the various visitations, the Commission believes that the Episcopal Church should encourage the U.S. government and all governments to support the Contadora peace process and *to end at once all covert and overt activities* aimed at destabilizing governments in Central America.

A number of parishes have created Central America study groups which focus on such areas as: education; encounters in personal visits by laity and clergy to the peoples of Central American countries to discern what our brothers and sisters in the faith are facing; discernment of the call of God on the parish's life and the creation of a comprehensive plan for the parish effectively to engage our mission in Central America; advocacy positions for the parish on foreign policy questions in Central America that have grown out of the parish's experience of education, encounter, and prayerful discernment of God's call upon the parish's life.

Clearly, there are many opportunities for parishes and dioceses to address this Central American situation. Further study of the report of the Presiding Bishop's Central America Task Force (June 1984) will guide and nurture the response of many Episcopalians. Visits to these areas by members of this Church will deepen personal knowledge of the human suffering which exists there. In the area of public policy, a change in U.S. Immigration policy with respect to Salvadoran refugees is clearly called for. A temporary safe haven would be possible through the U.S. government's granting an "extended voluntary departure" status to these refugees by a revised interpretation of current statutes.

Non-Violent Resistance

At the height of the civil rights movement in the 1960's, the House of Bishops issued guidelines for those members of the Episcopal Church who felt called to participate in acts of civil disobedience:

> "If and when the means of legal recourse have been exhausted, or are demonstrably inadequate, the Church recognizes the right of all persons, for reasons of informed conscience, to disobey such laws, so long as such persons
>
> (a) accept the legal penalty for their actions,
> (b) carry out their protest in a non-violent manner, and

(c) exercise severe restraint in using this privilege of conscience, because of the danger of lawlessness attendant thereon.

Before Christians participate in such actions, they should seek the will of God in prayer and the counsel of their fellow Christians."

House of Bishops, 1964
Position Paper III: *On Christian Obedience*

In 1978, the Lambeth Conference adopted a statement on *War and Violence,* which said in part:

"3(c). [We call Christian people everywhere] to engage themselves in non-violent action for justice and peace and to support others so engaged, recognizing that such action will be controversial and may be personally very costly."

In 1979 and 1982, the General Convention adopted this 1978 Lambeth Statement as a statement of its own, urging "all members of this Church to support by prayer, and by such other means as they deem appropriate, those who engage in such non-violent action." (1982)

During the 1960's and early 1970's, the Church was often in the position of responding after the fact to the use of civil disobedience as a means of achieving a change in policy. Now, however, the Church has an opportunity to help educate and guide those who feel called by God to commit such acts of civil disobedience.

In recent years a number of our fellow Episcopalians have engaged in acts of peaceful civil disobedience on a variety of fronts. As Lambeth has said, "Such action will be controversial and may be personally very costly." This being true, these actions often tend to polarize the Christian community and at times may even prove to be counter-productive.

A current list of some of these activities, which we neither condemn nor condone, would include: giving asylum to political refugees from Central America, war tax resistance, attempts to stop the "White Train" which carries nuclear warheads, peaceful sit-ins at abortion clinics, and protests at the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. and consulates around the country.

The situation has developed to the point where the Executive Council requested a conference on the topic "The Episcopal Church and Non-Violent Resistance" which brought 50 Episcopalians from around the country together for a time of learning and sharing in January 1985. Civil disobediance, inspired and guided by a conscientious concern for human life and a respect both for law and the sincerely-held views of others, properly calls for the pastoral care of this Church. In such instances personal guidance to those considering such actions with an informed conscience, and the development of educational materials for them and for those groups or individuals who may be called upon to urge caution or give support, represent important challenges for the next triennium. These concerns should be addressed by the Office of Peace and Justice and the Standing Commission on Peace and Justice if they are created by the 68th General Convention.

PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Two resolutions are recommended for action by this General Convention—one on deterrence and one on Central America, based on the material in this report.

Afterword

We have not been alone in addressing the issues mentioned here. The Commission notes with gratitude the many places where ecumenical cooperation has been a strengthening force in the work for peace and justice.

Running throughout our report has been the suggestion that polarization is an increasing difficulty facing us, even as we seek to implement the gospel of reconciliation. This irony is caused, in part, by the complex nature of the biblical concept of *shalom,* which says that *there can be no peace without justice and no justice without peace.* To confront a situation which is inadequate to express God's vision of *shalom* inevitably leads to conflict.

Many people are still concerned about what they consider to be the political overtones of Christian involvement in matters of peace and justice. It is worth reiterating that our concern in these areas comes neither from the Left nor from the Right, but from above.

In the years to come, it may well be that as Christians begin to recover some of the ground which was surrendered to a scientific pragmatism starting with the Enlightenment, and attempt with a fresh respect for diversity to call attention to the ethical and moral foundations which must undergird all human relationships, that tensions will increase. Such tensions can be both divisive and destructive if they are not informed by the Christian Gospel. They can also be creative and energizing if they are.

It rests with clergy and laity at all levels to act as mediators in their own basic communities. An exercise of great pastoral concern is called for to insure that *one Christian's concern not negate the concern of another,* and at the same time to insure that the creative energy inherent in conflict not be lost. Being a peacemaker within the community of peacemakers calls for great skill, deep commitment, and infinite patience.

RESOLUTIONS

Resolution #A—122

Whereas, the Joint Commission on Peace has been an official but temporary Commission of General Convention for six years, by action of two successive Conventions; and

Whereas, The work, reports (especially the 1982 report, *To Make Peace*) and other activities of this Commission have greatly benefited our Church and strengthened our individual ministries as peacemakers; and

Whereas, our Lord Jesus Christ calls upon his Church to be makers of Peace and Justice in the world; and

Whereas, it is now obvious that General Convention should establish a permanent Commission with special responsibilities in the areas of War, Peace, and Justice; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, **the House of _____ concurring, That Title I, Canon 1, Section 2(n) be amended to include the following new Standing Commission:**

(9) There shall be a Standing Commission on Peace and Justice, comprised of 12 members (3 Bishops, 3 Presbyters or Deacons, and 6 Lay Persons). It shall be the duty of the Commission to develop recommendations and strategies which will be of concrete assistance to this Church in furthering the work on issues of peace and justice.

Resolution #A—123

Resolved, **the House of _____ concurring, That the sum of $50,000 per year be appropriated for the triennium 1985-1988, from the Assessment Budget of the General Convention, for the support of the Standing Commission on Peace and Justice.**

EXPLANATION: We believe that the General Convention would benefit from a permanent commission on peace and justice issues. (The two Joint Commissions on Peace which have served during the past six years have been temporary bodies.) Peace and justice issues are inextricably linked. Such a permanent Commission would offer guidance and counsel to future General Conventions. By creating such a Commission, General Convention would be doing for itself what it has encouraged the wider Church community to do: to keep peacemaking a central and continuing focus of the life and witness of the Episcopal Church.

Resolution #A—124

Resolved, **the House of _____ concurring, That the 68th General Convention of the Episcopal Church of the United States of America authorizes and directs the Executive Council to create and staff an Office of Peace and Justice to support and coordinate a peacemaking ministry within the provinces, dioceses, and congregations of the Episcopal Church. The Office of Peace and Justice shall:**

1. **Provide support and resources on peacemaking and the promotion of justice;**
2. **Provide communication, coordination, and consultation to the Peace and Justice Network;**
3. **Establish appropriate links to the Anglican, denominational, ecumenical, and secular peace and justice programs and initiatives;**
4. **Provide guidance to those individuals and groups exercising ministries that contribute to the maintenance and enhancement of peace and justice; and**
5. **Collaborate with other program units in addressing peace and justice issues.**

Resolution #A—125

Resolved, **the House of _____ concurring, That the sum of $250,000 per year for the triennium 1985-1988 is appropriated to the Executive Council from the Church's Program Development Budget to create, staff, and support the Office of Peace and Justice.**

EXPLANATION: The first Joint Commission on Peace recommended nurturing an approach from the bottom up in bringing peacemaking into the life of the Episcopal Church. The second Joint Commission on Peace has monitored these efforts. It is now clear that staff support is required to help diocesan programs learn from one another, to provide resources to peacemakers throughout the Church, to enable international and ecumenical cooperation, to support those engaged in activities that foster peace and justice, and to collaborate with other program units in addressing peace and justice issues. By creating such an office, General Convention would then be doing for Executive Council what it has asked the wider Church community to do.

Resolution #A—126

Whereas, there has recently been created an Anglican Peace and Justice Network under the auspices of the Anglican Consultative Council, of which the Archbishop of Canterbury is President; and

Whereas, it is the sense of this General Convention that it is essential that the Episcopal Church of the United States of America support this global network in every reasonable way; therefore, be it

Resolved, **the House of _____ concurring, That the 68th General Convention appropriate the sum of $83,000 per year for the triennium 1985-1988 from the Program Development Budget of the Church to the Archbishop of Canterbury, solely for the support of the work of the Anglican Peace and Justice Network.**

EXPLANATION: The work for peace and justice extends beyond our parochial boundaries. In the light of developments mentioned above it is important for the Episcopal Church to continue to support the work of the Anglican Communion under the auspices of the Anglican Consultative Council. We recommend that $83,000 per year for the triennium be allocated by the General Convention to the Archbishop of Canterbury for this endeavor.

Resolution #A—127

Whereas, the 1982 report of the Joint Commission on Peace, entitled *To Make Peace,* was received by the 67th General Convention three years ago; and

Whereas, approximately 50,000 copies of *To Make Peace* have been distributed throughout the Church for study, discussion, and analysis; and

Whereas, it has proved to be a significant stimulus to the thoughtful and prayerful consideration of peacemaking; therefore, be it

Resolved, **the House of _____ concurring, That the 68th General Convention of the Episcopal Church of the United States of America approves the report *To Make Peace* and adopts it as an official statement on the issues of war and peace.**

EXPLANATION: The report of the first Joint Commission on Peace, entitled *To Make Peace,* has been distributed throughout the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion. The 1982 General Convention "received" it and commended it for study. We now recommend that the 68th General Convention adopt it as an official statement of the Episcopal Church.

Resolution #A—128

Resolved, **the House of _____ concurring, That the 68th General Convention refers to parishes, dioceses, and provinces of this Church, for critical study and reflection, the report of the Joint Commission on Peace on deterrence made to the House of Bishops meeting in 1984, and the statement on deterrence approved in substance by the World Council of Churches at its meeting in the Summer of 1983 in Vancouver.**

EXPLANATION: The report of the JCP to the House of Bishops on deterrence is reproduced in full in the Blue Book. A key section of the WCC Vancouver statement is printed at the beginning of Part II of this report; this is part of a larger document which also merits study. Both statements would be referred to the wider Church for study and reflection if this resolution were passed.

Resolution #A—129

Resolved, **the House of _____ concurring, That this 68th General Convention supports the unanimous vote of the Executive Council of the Episcopal Church calling on the United States government, and all other governments involved, to take concrete**

actions in support of the Contadora initiative and process; to work toward negotiated, rather than military, solutions to regional conflicts; to cease all covert and overt activities aimed at destabilizing governments in the region; to affirm and respect the principles of national sovereignty, self-determination, and non-intervention in domestic affairs; and to respect human rights; and be it further

***Resolved,* That dioceses and congregations encourage all members to study this declaration of the Executive Council, and to share their individual views on this declaration and the situation in Central America with those in authority in Washington.**

EXPLANATION: We believe the solution to the crisis in Central America lies in a negotiated settlement, based on the 21 points of the Contadora Group. Under this peace plan, agreements would be negotiated to prohibit foreign military bases, reduce and ultimately eliminate foreign military advisors, terminate the flow of armaments, and expand humanitarian and development assistance to the region.

Some governments, including that of the United States, have pursued policies contrary to the goals of the Contadora plan, despite their endorsement of the initiative. For this reason, we feel it would be useful for the General Convention to endorse the action of the Executive Council of the Episcopal Church, and call the attention of congregations across the land to this concern.

BUDGET AND EXPENDITURES

The budget and expenditures of the Joint Commission on Peace during the past triennium are as follows:

1983	
Budgeted	$ 11,650.00
Expenditures—two meetings of the full Commission, plus minor administrative expense	6,735.76
Balance	$ 4,914.24
1984	
Budgeted	$ 16,650.00
Expenditures—three meetings of the full Commission, plus administrative expense, and editorial committee	17,528.68
Balance	$ (858.68)
1985	
Budgeted	$ 6,200
Expenditures—one meeting, and editorial costs	
Total (minus 1984 overdraft)	$ 5,341.32

APPENDIX A

DETERRENCE

A Report of the Joint Commission on Peace to the House of Bishops
October, 1984

This report was prepared by a drafting committee of the Joint Commission on Peace and reviewed at two stages of its development at meetings of the JCP in February and May, 1984, in New York City. Members of the Commission, at the Commission's request, were joined by three additional members of the House of Bishops at the May meeting for the purpose of reviewing the general direction of the draft. This, the final version, reflects further revisions made at the suggestion of members of the Commission following the May meeting.

Consultants appointed by the
Presiding Bishop for the meeting of May, 1984:

The Rt. Rev. FitzSimons Allison
The Rt. Rev. Charles Duvall
The Rt. Rev. Walter Dennis

I. Preamble

At its meeting in Spokane in the fall of 1983, the House of Bishops asked that the Joint Commission on Peace "conduct a thorough study of (A) the psychology and morality of deterrence in general, and (B) the particular application of deterrence to the international arms race in order that this Church may give prudential guidance to its membership regarding the moral questions involved in these complex issues as citizen responsibilities are exercised." In responding to this request, the Joint Commission has elected to provide as its working paper, not the formulation of a particular position on deterrence, but rather a series of ways in which the subject may be further and fruitfully discussed by the bishops at their 1984 meeting and referred to other bodies within the Church. Our procedure reflects the belief that we can serve more effectively as a committee of inquiry defining the issues in an open-ended way than as a jury bringing in a verdict on one of the most troubling ethical and religious issues of our time.

Both the report of our antecedent Commission, *To Make Peace,* and the more recent report of the National Council of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,* recognize the complexities of the deterrence issue. In its report to general Convention in New Orleans, the Commission wrote: "A strategy of nuclear deterrence is at best a necessary evil for the short term. . . . Christians who accept nuclear deterrence as morally defensible can do so legitimately only if at the same time they understand its primary purpose to be the buying of a little more time to work for other, more peaceful, less apocalyptic alternatives."[1] And the Roman Catholic bishops arrived at "a strictly-conditioned acceptance of nuclear deterrence. We cannot consider it adequate as a long-term basis for peace" (par. 186). Some have argued more recently that deterrence,

[1] *To Make Peace* (Cincinnati: Forward Movement Publications, 1982), p. 14. Christian thinking about deterrence needs to be grounded in attention to our understanding of God, his revelation in Jesus Christ, and the experience of the Church, which three subjects are explored in the report's preceding pages. Those pages (6-14) should therefore be reread as background to what follows here.

far from preserving an imagined equilibrium in which two unfriendly powers reach a stand-off by concluding that each has the power to destroy the other, has instead become a justification for the build-up of nuclear arms and has thus arguably proved to be inherently destabilizing. If this is the case—and we are inevitably compressing a variety of complex matters into a short space—then the acceptance of deterrence, even in the guarded, short-range terms envisioned by the JCP and the NCCB, may turn out to be the *undoing* of deterrence.

Our own commentary is informed by a recognition of both moral urgencies and moral ambiguities. On one side are the proponents of traditional pacifism. Closely allied with them, in terms of conclusions if not in their initial moral premises, are those who argue that it is inherently wrong morally to threaten to use weapons that it would be immoral to use in fact. Based on the conviction that nuclear weapons are indiscriminately destructive by nature, and that the actual use of any such weapons would violate traditional just war criteria, they oppose not only the resort to the use of any nuclear weapons but the threat to employ them as a deterrent. Others who also oppose the threat to use, or the actual use of, nuclear weapons in ways that violate just war criteria, arrive at a somewhat different conclusion. They believe that violations of just war principles (especially discrimination and proportionality) may well result from immoral military strategy decisions, but that such immorality is not inherent in the weapons themselves or in their deterrent function. They therefore do not rule out any and all use categorically and in advance. Finally, there are those who, equally agonized by the existence of nuclear weapons and their potentially destructive power, nonetheless believe that they have helped to keep the peace and, since they cannot be disinvented, must be maintained and modernized as effective instruments of deterrence. Any substantial restrictions on their further development, production, or deployment, except under the most carefully-controlled conditions (this argument continues), could invite an aggressor to take advantage of an insufficiently-defended population.

We shall take further note of these and other views presently. At the outset, however, while we do not intend to recommend adoption of any single policy option as the normative one for the Church, we do concur on a premise underlying further discussion. That premise is that the word "deterrence" reflects a wide range of meanings, and that its translation into action may be embodied in a number of different alternatives. Deterrence has traditionally been taken to mean dissuasion of an adversary from launching an attack, dissuasion accomplished by the threat of retaliation at an unacceptable cost to an aggressor. Thus at the very least deterrence is meant to inculcate a sober, rational calculation of outcomes in the mind of a potential aggressor and to evoke a fear of the consequences of an aggressive action. We believe, however, that fear is not the sole, and certainly not the healthiest, basis for deterrence; and therefore we propose an expanded meaning of the term. Deterrence, viewed in its more constructive sense of "dissuasion," may be grounded in an appeal to a potential adversary's assessment of where his real interest lies, namely in peace. The instruments of such an appeal are numerous, and include not only various forms of arms control and disarmament, or collective security through international and regional peace-keeping mechanisms, but also other aspects of diplomacy as well as personal contacts, commercial and economic relations, cultural exchanges, environmental treaties, and common concerns around which the international religious, scholarly, business, and scientific communities can rally.[2] Thus even advocates of deterrence who look first to measures of military preparedness are more than ready to bolster these with negotiated treaties of arms control. Once the practical realities are faced, a

[2] *To Make Peace,* pp. 17-19.

wide range of alternative stances and procedures of negotiation is opened up for possible employment.

Debate on arms control must not be confined to arms control experts. In a democracy, citizens must be clear about the basic moral and prudential issues, and have a special responsibility to exert pressure against bellicosity and for prudence, restraint, and perhaps even compassion in arms control negotiations. More centrally, for this occasion, we would affirm that constructive dissuasion, appealing both to others' enlightened self-interest and to considerations of our common humanity, is rooted in the vision of the Gospel, which obligates us to emulate, even if we cannot fully reenact, Christ's unconditional love.

With this by way of background, we offer four concepts of deterrent strategy and several examples of tactical approaches which may obtain in one or more deterrent situations. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive; it is possible that more than one may be a legitimate option for a government to pursue, and a Christian to support, depending on a given situation. All strategic options presuppose a possible extension of the disarmament process from the reduction of nuclear to the reduction of conventional weaponry, as well as of "non-conventional," non-nuclear weapons such as the chemical and bacteriological. They all presuppose a halt to the further development of such emerging technologies as space weapons. We offer them in the hope that all possibilities will be discussed by the House of Bishops, and that the House will take appropriate and decisive action.

Because this paper cannot offer a definitive treatment of a complex topic, and because our primary purpose is to provoke further analysis prior to the formulation of any detailed position, we conclude with some illustrative questions that might serve as the basis for discussion by the House of Bishops.

II. Deterrence Strategies

The Joint Commission here outlines a series of deterrent strategies along with the political and psychological rationales sometimes offered for and against each in the course of public debate. Because of the need to keep this document brief, the summary of adversarial positions is intentionally not exhaustive; both advocates and critics of each option can undoubtedly provide further arguments. Our intention is to initiate rather than to foreclose further discussion.

Option A: Military Advantage

Premise: The U.S. should seek to maintain a decisive nuclear, as well as conventional, military advantage.

Advocates argue that assuming the worst—that the enemy will attack, or take drastic advantage of us if he ever sees us slacken—we cannot negotiate except through strength. If we have convinced an adversary that we're ahead and will stay ahead, this decisive advantage may discourage him from developing weaponry further, and so ensure that we come to the negotiating table with bargaining chips which can be used to the end of reducing and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. Only in this way will peace be brought about with justice. Advocates also argue that a defensive strategy requires a large number of retaliatory weapons, since one cannot accurately predict how many weapons will be left after an initial attack by an adversary, and some redundancy is necessary to insure a retaliatory capacity sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage even after absorbing a first strike.

Critics respond that not only is this policy blind to Soviet attitudes, but that it makes deterrence a function of escalation and increases crisis-instability. Diplomatic and arms-control history indicate that the atmosphere for bargaining is harmed rather than advanced when one nation feels itself to be falling behind in an arms race; thus, attempts to seek military advantage forestall the kind of patient, exploratory negotiating that is necessary to triumph over suspicion and hostility. The U.S. build-up of military capability in recent years was a response to a perception that the U.S.S.R. was seeking military advantage with its large increase in nuclear weapons in the 1970's, especially the SS-18's and SS-20's. Likewise, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from arms limitation talks in Geneva was a response to what that country perceived as an attempt on the part of the U.S. to seek just such an advantage.

Option B: Parity

Premise: The cornerstone of U.S. nuclear policy should be to "stay even with," not attempt to exceed, technical developments in arms on the other side.

Advocates argue that all that deterrence requires is an approximate parity between, or among, possible opponents. We are justified in taking whatever steps are necessary to stay even with a prospective foe, because to fall behind is to invite hostile initiatives (in whatever form) directed against us. Negotiations can thus take place in an atmosphere of equivalency. As with Option A, advocates also argue that no less than parity is necessary if a retaliatory capacity, sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker, is to remain after absorbing a first strike.

Critics state that it is practically impossible, on the basis of either intelligence-gathering or high-level political and diplomatic contacts, to define "parity" in an arms race. In practice, the public debate is usually conducted in terms of catching up rather than pulling ahead, but in fact the concept of equilibrium hypothesizes a point of stability which can never be located and in any case is not likely to endure while research on new weaponry continues.

Option C: Sufficiency, or Minimal Deterrence

Premise: The U.S. should work for nuclear arms reduction to the lowest possible level of retaliatory capacity sufficient to respond if attacked.

Advocates argue that all that is needed to deter an enemy is enough to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage on his nation, and that this can be done with a relatively small number of nuclear weapons. President Carter's 1977 proposal to the Soviets, which they rejected, for deep cuts in strategic weapons was based on this concept of "minimal deterrence." Supporters of this position usually support the nuclear freeze (see Section III.C below). Such a position shifts the emphasis away from considerations of superiority or inferiority, and also makes it more likely that there can be significant reductions in military budgets, at least in the category of nuclear weaponry. A policy of focusing on each side's interests, rather than on bargaining positions, avoids counterproductive diversions of the sort that arise during a contest of wills.

Critics of this position find it morally indefensible in its implications. A minimal deterrent of perhaps a few hundred nuclear weapons, if it is to be effective at all, must be based on a countercity strategy. It would be an ineffective deterrent if it were aimed at only the most important of the thousands of military targets. Thus to be credible it

must threaten the mass murder of citizens in an adversary's centers of population, something directly contrary to just war criteria. Any credible deterrent policy designed to be effective against legitimate military targets (i.e., counterforce strategy) must have more than a minimal capability. It is also argued that such reduction ties progress to the slow pace of complex negotiations, and that in Europe, for example, the unwillingness of the NATO allies to increase their spending for conventional forces requires the continued development of tactical nuclear weapons in order to protect Europe.

Option D: Non-Nuclear Deterrence

Premise: The U.S. should lead the way assertively, in challenging negotiations, toward reliance on non-nuclear defensive arms only, while denouncing all forms of indiscriminate bombing or shelling. Some conventional military build-up will probably be necessary, at least for the transition.

Advocates argue that both legitimate needs of national self-defense and the danger of an overreliance on weapons of mass destruction make a heightened reliance on conventional arms a realistic and morally-justifiable option: realistic because it preserves a deterrent posture, morally justifiable because it helps satisfy the criteria of proportionality and restraint envisioned in traditional just war theory. By shifting our emphasis to conventional weapons, we signal any prospective antagonist not only of the seriousness of our resolve, but also of our simultaneous willingness to abandon the cherished but debilitating illusion that nuclear missiles and raids on cities pay off. The policy will sharply reduce the moral dissonance between our thought and action, and make the U.S. less vulnerable to either blackmail or tides of irresponsible patriotism. To direct our military technology toward defense (anti-aircraft, anti-tank, non-nuclear ABM) would enable us to aid Third World countries in a less destabilizing way, and would imply the protection of nuclear arms-making capacity under agreed international inspection, since such capacity cannot be eliminated and will remain a major deterrent.

Critics, who represent either "peace through strength" or arms control points of view, respond that such a policy, unless introduced gradually and with care and luck, would destabilize most political understandings in our world. Switzerland pursues such a policy successfully, but does not carry such weight in the world that its inadvertencies are likely to be disastrous to others. From the military point of view, such a shift in emphasis may weaken the deterrent posture through an inability to rely on tactical nuclear weapons if the less aggressive side falls behind in the balance of conventional arms. Disarmanent proponents, for their part, often argue that the increasingly destructive character of conventional arms is obliterating any distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. Both groups may call into question the economic and social costs of a substantial conventional build-up; by some measurements, at least, nuclear weaponry is cheaper and reduces reliance on large conventional forces and on the draft.

III. Alternatives within the deterrence framework

Throughout debates over arms control run at least two threads, one of which, the more general and conceptual, we have just been describing as a series of strategic options. In this section, we turn to a variety of more specific actions that may occur under one or more of the options we have just been describing. Neither our foregoing list nor this one is to be taken as exhaustive. Rather, our intention is to open the discussion by setting up for review some of the more commonly-argued embodiments of deterrence in practice.

A. First-Strike Capability

"First strike" refers to the strategy and/or the capability to launch a massive and preemptive nuclear attack that would be of such magnitude that the opponent would be incapable of responding with a significant counterattack. A first-strike *strategy* is a matter of military policy decision. A first strike *capability* is a matter of both numbers and capabilities of nuclear weapons. It would require first a number of strategic weapons large enough to destroy all enemy targets capable of launching missiles. This usually means at least two weapons per site to allow for a sufficient margin of error. A first-strike capability would require, second, that these weapons have the power and accuracy to knock out hard-target missile sites. A first-strike weapon is one that has such capability, although it would not allow for a first-strike strategy unless such weapons existed in sufficient numbers.

A first-strike strategy could be adopted as a strategy of deterrence, although no nation at present claims to do so. Such a strategy is also, of course, a function of an opponent's defensive capabilities which may improve with hardening of targets or missile defense systems. It is also an incentive for an opponent to develop his own first-strike weapon. So it seems to be an inherently destabilizing strategy, guaranteeing continued escalation of the arms race.

One of the moral dilemmas of nuclear deterrence is the fact that any concept of just war requires that targets be military targets, i.e., combatants, military installations, missile sites, war-related industry, and so forth. This requires weapons with sufficient accuracy to discriminate between such targets and non-military targets such as population centers. As weapons with greater accuracy and precision are developed, however, they may well be perceived by an opponent as first-strike weapons. This leads to the paradox in which some see the development of more accurate "counterforce" weapons (aimed at military targets) as dangerous, destabilizing, and morally reprehensible, while they see less accurate "countercity" weapons as maintaining stability and being more morally acceptable.

B. Build-Down

A proposal often advanced as a less drastic alternative to the nuclear freeze (C below) is the "build-down" approach, whereby two or more parties to negotiation agree to destroy, say, two current weapons for every one built. The primary importance of such an agreement would be that it would make possible the destruction of multiple-warhead missiles and the substitution for them of single-warhead missiles. This would result in both a reduction in the number of warheads and a nuclear deterrent that is less inviting to a preemptive strike. It would therefore result (or so it is argued) in greater political stability. Both proponents and opponents of this approach would seem to agree that its operative force depends on the precise nature of the trade-off, with skeptics suggesting that the sacrifice of, say, two less technically advanced weapons which are defensive in nature, for one which is both more advanced and fundamentally destabilizing, is only a spurious form of arms control. Clearly the terms of such an arrangement would have to be very carefully negotiated to satisfy either the advocates of military strength or disarmament proponents.

C. The Nuclear Freeze

Although the freeze has already commanded the support of a number of religious, secular, and political bodies, and much of the public, a brief discussion is warranted here

to put it in the context of deterrence theory. Proponents of the freeze postulate that the arms race has gone far enough to justify a bilateral and verifiable halt in the nuclear arms race. They suggest that the awesome force of nuclear weapons, and their possession in massive numbers by major world powers, is itself a sufficient deterrent at this time to make any further escalation of the arms race unnecessary. At times of hostile deadlock, the first step should be to seize on or invent options of mutual gain. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. (it is argued) are now at a point of substantial nuclear parity, and instruments for verifying observance of a freeze are now available. Given the horrendous complexity of mutual monitoring and hair-trigger arrangements, risk-reduction centers at, e.g., Washington and Moscow would help identify false alarms and prevent a recurrence of such an unintended war as that which broke out in 1914. Even if such a freeze seemed only to perpetuate present inequities, it would still provide for a relaxation of tensions which would be more conducive to negotiations immediately following.

Those who oppose the freeze do so primarily for two reasons. First, by freezing nuclear weapons where they are now, the proposal seems to assume and even necessitate the continuation of a deterrent policy of mutual assured destruction. This means that it is coupled with the most morally unacceptable response to a failure of deterrence, i.e., the destruction of centers of population. Second, by precluding further testing, production, or deployment of nuclear weapons, a freeze would halt efforts to increase the credibility and stability, as well as the survivability, of the present deterrent through a program of weapons modernization. For example, development of anti-submarine and anti-aircraft capabilities would not be frozen, but more effective delivery systems would be. A freeze could thus actually weaken the present system of deterrence and make the morally unacceptable policy of indiscriminate use a more likely necessity as the only possible response (short of doing nothing) to an attack insufficiently deterred. Numbers of weapons, in this argument, are important, and there are definitely too many; but numbers are not as important as credibility and stability.

The fact that many opponents of a freeze state that they would support the concept under certain conditions suggests that, at least in theory, a freeze could be endorsed by all segments of the population, military or civilian, with a stake in some form of arms control. Obviously, however, those subscribing to, e.g., the doctrine of military advantage would demand a much higher threshold of proof that the freeze was risk-free than others endorsing other options.

D. Independent Initiatives

Those who feel the freeze does not go far enough include some who would emphasize limited but concrete and reversible steps to begin to wind down the nuclear arms race. They feel that the present climate of international distrust makes it essential that the negotiation deadlock be broken by a positive gesture on one side. Such an initiative could take any of a number of forms, such as a unilateral decision not to deploy a particular weapon in the European theater, and could always be reversed if there were no reciprocal move by the adversary power. If reciprocity occurred, scalebacks could take place on both sides, and bargaining could resume in an atmosphere of reduced tensions. Persons holding this position may endorse the freeze, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, as a first step, but place less emphasis on conditions of verifiability and mutuality in the undertaking of an initiative.

On the other side of this issue are those who feel that a definition of reciprocity is difficult if not impossible in circumstances in which both sides differ sharply in their perception of relative strength. Furthermore, a unilateral gesture, if perceived by the

antagonist power as a symptom of weakness in the deterrent posture or of lessened resolve, may well be less rather than more likely to improve the atmosphere for negotiations.

Some who favor independent initiatives go further to question whether any nuclear power has the right to do other than reduce (in a series of phased steps) and finally eliminate altogether its nuclear arsenal. For such persons, any consideration of reciprocity is virtually irrelevant; the wind-down should proceed irrespective of what the other side does in return. Such a series of steps would show good faith in opening up new negotiating opportunities, but nonetheless this can be termed a deterrent tactic only in the extremely enlarged and relaxed sense of an appeal to world opinion and to the best impulses, as well as interests, of the potential aggressor.

Those who oppose this more drastic form of independent initiatives point out that it represents a counsel of unilateral disarmament, and might not only undercut any reasonable likelihood of progress at the negotiating table, but could well invite nuclear blackmail or a preemptive strike. They reason that justice, indeed respect for human life itself, are not served by asking a nation to undertake a risk of this magnitude. Turning the other cheek, they argue further, is advice meant to govern individual relationships, not international ones. They also question whether it is ever realistic to expect that a nation, however pacific and well-disposed, would under no condition reverse such initiatives if a threat to its interests and very survival emerged.

E. Civil Defense

Civil defense against nuclear attack, such as construction of underground shelters or plans for speedy evacuation of cities, is currently part of the deterrence problem but need not remain so. Proponents of civil defense argue that it is unthinkable and immoral to fail to take precautions to protect a civilian population against nuclear attack, and that such a move cannot conceivably be interpreted as a threatening one. Opponents point out that the question of how many, or what, can survive a nuclear attack is radically undecidable, and that such construction may increase a false sense of security on the part of the public, thus robbing arms reduction efforts of their impetus. The experience of World War II indicates that bomb shelters may, under certain conditions, merely prove to be incinerators. Some opponents of civil defense go further still and argue that a massive shelter construction program in this country might send a signal to an aggressor that we were contemplating a major strike, and would thus invite the possibility of a preemptive attack.

Civil defense can powerfully affect the psychological dimension of deterrence. The Chamberlain government's provision of gas masks for all British citizens in 1939 may well have strengthened British morale even before (as may arguably have happened) it deterred Hitler from using poison gas against English cities. Americans have strong historical reasons for instinctively disliking shelters, which among Londoners may instead evoke memories of the friendly safety of the Underground during the night hours of the blitz. On the other hand, shelters and evacuation plans can seem more practical if the world moves toward a greater reliance on defensive weapons, with offensive weapons reduced by treaty. Then, as also in the face of any threat from single terrorist attacks, the United States might be in a position more nearly analogous to that of Switzerland, which is not perceived abroad as a potential aggressor and where a concrete shelter is as much a part of life as seat-belts in a car.

F. Non-Violent Civilian Resistance

Students of the Danish resistance to Hitler and Gandhi's campaign against the British in India have sometimes come to the conclusion that the U.S. should educate its people to an understanding of, and skill in, non-violent resistance against any aggression from beyond its borders or against the tyranny imposed by an occupying power. Proponents of such training may root their views in traditional pacifism and join the call for non-violent resistance to a call for complete and, if necessary, unilateral disarmament. Others see civilian resistance as one of a number of tactics which can be classified under deterrence. Their call for such a tactic may be local, rooted primarily in considerations of prudence; and, depending on a situation in a particular war zone or occupied area, they may be willing to entertain it in conjunction with some form of military or guerrilla resistance to an occupying power.

Whether conditions in Denmark or India are transferable to this country for the empowering of a civilian non-violent resistance movement is the subject of considerable debate. Many point out that the constructive influence of the U.S. on other countries has been chiefly through the words and deeds of figures like Thoreau, Lincoln, and Martin Luther King, as contrasted with the leaders of our forces in Vietnam. They extrapolate from such examples a basis for the deterrent effect of non-violent resistance. Others point out that the U.S. is not socially homogeneous or conformist, and that the policy, not being in the characteristic American grain, is likely to be felt as surrender. Thus any breach of solidarity would be likely to precipitate Petainism, corruption, and chaotic and unfocused resistance. They also question whether the non-violent resistance of a King to unjust laws emanating from a domestic government subject to democratic processes is properly analogous to resistance to occupation by a foreign power.

On balance, little is available to indicate how this method might work in the U.S. If, however, there already existed a situation in which the United States, because of its renunciation of nuclear weapons, actually found itself occupied, it is at least possible that the same attitude which led to the refusal to employ such weapons would encourage experimentation with other than violent methods of resistance. This subject, we feel, needs far more study from both a political and a moral/theological perspective.

IV. Afterword

It has been argued that deterrence, in its narrower, more traditional sense of military preparedness, has kept the peace since 1945, at least in preventing a Third and probably cataclysmic World War. Critics, on the other hand, may argue that to say that deterrence "works" is rather like someone shouting triumphantly, as he falls past the sixtieth floor of a skyscraper, that he has not hit the ground yet. Obviously we have been able to do no more than provide the most schematic overview of the issue, to present several of the principal options, and to try to summarize arguments fairly on both sides. We would suggest that the following are among the questions which would need to be addressed in a fuller discussion:

A. If we abandon the traditional military deterrent theory, what modication of it would we replace it with? Is it possible to make do with only a "moral" deterrent? With none at all?

B. Has deterrence kept the peace at all levels? If it has kept the peace, has it served the ends of justice? For example, has the fear of nuclear war actually made conventional intervention on the side of nascent democracy (e.g., Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland today) less rather than more likely?

C. Given advances in more precise nuclear weaponry—weapons whose effects are more closely limited to military targets and can thus be adjudged more nearly discriminate—does the existence of these weapons make all-out war more or less likely? Can the same be asked of increasingly powerful conventional weapons? Is war a more realistic option, and therefore more tempting, if it is known that there are alternatives to "big, dirty" bombs, or does the fear of escalation itself provide an adequate hedge against an outbreak of war?

D. Closely related to C., would it be possible to level off a nuclear exchange below the point of maximum (and possibly mutual) destruction, using such weapons without ultimately resorting to countercity weapons aimed at population centers?

E. Most of this paper has presented the arms race in terms of bilateral superpower confrontation. What additional strengths and/or weaknesses does the theory of deterrence have in the light of the spread of nuclear weapons to other developed countries? To the Third World? What further complications for the theory are posed by international arms sales?

F. What are the prospects that an effective international agency could exert a counterweight to the spread of arms and thus lead to a reduction of reliance on the deterrent theory?

G. Critics of arms control argue that despite disarmament talks, there has been a steady increase in conventional and nuclear weapon stockpiling, and that such talks are thereby proved to serve merely to rationalize build-ups to the level imposed by the particular treaty. Others argue that serious negotiations do indeed reduce tensions, and point to the test ban treaty as a case in point. Which do you feel is the closer to reality in the short run? the long run?

H. To what extent should the Church be constrained by tactical, prudential considerations in responding to the arms race? That is, if nuclear deterrence is considered, in the language of *To Make Peace,* "at best a necessary evil for the short term," how do we know when the short term is over? If the use of such weapons is sinful, is their existence sinful in the absence of incremental arms reduction, and alternatively is their existence morally tolerable if such reduction is ongoing? Is the *contemplation* of their use as morally reprehensible as, arguably, their *actual* use might be?

We look forward to the results of the Bishops' deliberations on these issues, and offer them our prayers in the task that lies ahead.